Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25590 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2007,016
Publisher: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Abstract: 
Does geographic distance or the perceived social distance between subjects significantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects play a one-shot ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and a passive dummy player) and asymmetric information (only the proposer knows what can be distributed). Treatments differ in their geographic scope by involving either one or three different locations in Germany. Observed behavior reflects the robust stylized facts of this class of ultimatum experiments and can be adequately explained by other-regarding preferences. While responder behavior does not condition on co-players’ location of residence, self-interest of proposers varies significantly with the latter. Altogether, we do not detect strong discrimination based on geographic distance.
Subjects: 
ultimatum bargaining
cross-cultural experiments
social preferences
JEL: 
C78
C91
Z13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
521.95 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.