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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25168
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Kragl, Jenny | en |
dc.contributor.author | Schmid, Julia | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-01-15 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-23T14:44:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-23T14:44:24Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25168 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study the effects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects the agent's individual contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more profitable. Furthermore, for some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with inequity averse agents. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2006,085 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D63 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M52 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M54 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | principal-agent | en |
dc.subject.keyword | relational contract | en |
dc.subject.keyword | inequity aversion | en |
dc.subject.keyword | envy | en |
dc.title | Relational contracts and inequity aversion | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 522570267 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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