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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Schöttner, Anja | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-05-29 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-23T14:43:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-23T14:43:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25071 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2005,052 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M51 | en |
dc.subject.jel | M54 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | job design | en |
dc.subject.keyword | multi-tasking | en |
dc.subject.keyword | relational contracts | en |
dc.title | Relational contracts and job design | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 512449732 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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