Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23945
Authors: 
Schöbel, Enrico
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper / Universität Erfurt, Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät 2006,002E
Abstract: 
Auditing institutions, such as the German Federal Court of Audit (BRH), provide information on public revenue and public spending. The question of how to increase tax compliance has been of frequent interest. Unfortunately, information from German taxpayers? declaration behaviour (beyond the official income statistics and tax statistics) was neither systematically collected, nor otherwise made accessible for systematic research. However, the BRH selectively observes taxpayers? and tax administrators? behaviour and, on the basis of its audit experiences, comments on tax enforcement and tax compliance. Such recommendations are not just increasingly given by the BRH, but also increasingly considered in political decision making processes. Although the findings are not a representative sample of the German taxpayers? behaviour, they make up available information on tax compliance behaviour in Germany and, therefore, are worth discussing in light of modern economic theories of tax compliance. The reported facts are an appropriate foundation of case studies.
Subjects: 
supreme auditing institutions
German Federal Court of Audit
tax administration
tax compliance
tax evasion
tax morality
transactional costs
JEL: 
K42
K34
H26
H83
Z13
P16
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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