Universität Erfurt, Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Erfurt
Auditing institutions, such as the German Federal Court of Audit (BRH), provide information on public revenue and public spending. The question of how to increase tax compliance has been of frequent interest. Unfortunately, information from German taxpayers? declaration behaviour (beyond the official income statistics and tax statistics) was neither systematically collected, nor otherwise made accessible for systematic research. However, the BRH selectively observes taxpayers? and tax administrators? behaviour and, on the basis of its audit experiences, comments on tax enforcement and tax compliance. Such recommendations are not just increasingly given by the BRH, but also increasingly considered in political decision making processes. Although the findings are not a representative sample of the German taxpayers? behaviour, they make up available information on tax compliance behaviour in Germany and, therefore, are worth discussing in light of modern economic theories of tax compliance. The reported facts are an appropriate foundation of case studies.
supreme auditing institutions German Federal Court of Audit tax administration tax compliance tax evasion tax morality transactional costs