Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23533 
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dc.contributor.authorBuehler, Stefanen
dc.contributor.authorHaucap, Justusen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:27:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:27:08Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-1486en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23533-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market. We apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to characterize the different equilibria. We find that outsourcing generally softens competition in the final product market. If firms anticipate the impact of their outsourcing decisions on input prices, there may be equilibria where firms outsource so as to collude or to raise rivals' costs. We illustrate our analysis using a linear Cournot model.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre |cHamburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionspapier |x15en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelL24en
dc.subject.jelL23en
dc.subject.jelL22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwOutsourcingen
dc.subject.stwDuopolen
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommener Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleStrategic Outsourcing Revisited-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn369947185en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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