Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/235205 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 315
Versionsangabe: 
June 2021
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
Private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to study this issue. Firms choose whether to join a cartel, may apply for leniency afterwards, and then potentially face private damages. We find that the implementation of private damage claims reduces cartel formation but makes cartels indeed more stable. The negative effect of damages is avoided in a novel setting where the whistleblower is also protected from damages.
Schlagwörter: 
Private damage claims
cartel stability
laboratory experiment
leniency
JEL: 
C90
L41
L44
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-597-5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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