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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23413
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bannier, Christina E. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-29T16:05:27Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-29T16:05:27Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23413 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies optimal risk-taking and information disclosure by firms that obtain financing from both a 'relationship' bank and 'arm's-length' banks. We find that firm decisions are asymmetrically influenced by the degree of heterogeneity among banks: lowly-collateralized firms vary optimal risk and information precision along with the degree of relationship lending for projects with low expected cash-flows, while highly-collateralized firms do so for projects with high expected cash-flows. Incidences of inefficient project liquidation are minimized if the former firms rely on relationship banking to a low degree, the latter to a large degree. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aJohann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |cFrankfurt a. M. | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Paper Series: Finance & Accounting |x148 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L14 | en |
dc.subject.jel | G21 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Risk | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Relationship Lending | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Asymmetric Information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Liquidity Crisis | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Efficiency | en |
dc.subject.stw | Finanzierungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kredit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Bank | en |
dc.subject.stw | Risikomanagement | en |
dc.subject.stw | Investor Relations | en |
dc.subject.stw | Projektfinanzierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing, Optimal Business Risk and Information Disclosure | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 48439102X | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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