Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/233867
Authors: 
Evangelinos, Christos
Wittkowski, Antje
Püschel, Ronny
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Institut für Wirtschaft und Verkehr No. 2/2016
Abstract: 
Conventional economic models in airport regulation assume, that airports have considerable market power and may exploit it against airlines. Given, that many airports are served by only a limited number of airlines, mono- or oligopsony relationships may exist. This paper relaxes therefore this assumption. We use an existing model to test the impact of mono- and duopsony on the outcome of several regulatory options. Our results show, that in such cases the binding conditions for airport charges may change and, hence, optimal airport regulation should take into account also the degree of mono- or oligopsony airline power. In some cases the abolishment of any kind of regulation can lead to welfare gains.
Subjects: 
Airport Regulation
Single-Till
Dual-Till
Aitline Monopsony and Oligopsony Power
JEL: 
L51
L93
R41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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