Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233323 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 108
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with the path-braking result of Maskin [Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38.], and therefore, it allows us to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the collective.
Subjects: 
Characterization
Implementation
Nash equilibrium
Other regarding preferences
Procedural fairness
JEL: 
C72
D64
D70
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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