Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233267 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 51
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods goes to infinity while the dead line is kept fixed. This limit is close to the Raiffa solution when the time horizon is very short. If the dead line goes to infinity the limit outcome converges to the time preference Nash solution. The limit outcome is given an axiomatic characterization as well.
Subjects: 
Nash solution
Raiffa solution
bargaining
JEL: 
C71
C72
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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