Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233250 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 34
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
This paper studies allocations that can be implemented by an arbitrator subject to the constraint that the agents' outside option is to start bargaining by themselves. As the population becomes large, the set of implementable allocations shrinks to a singleton point - the conflict-free allocation. Finally, the conflict-free allocation can be implemented via a simple "lobbying" game where parties composed of agents with similar preferences bid for the right to be the first proposer in a bargaining game among the parties, i.e. in the "political game".
Subjects: 
non-cooperative bargaining
arbitration
implementation
JEL: 
C72
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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