Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233244 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 28
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite congestion and coordination games. Player set is divided into two disjoint groups, called men and women. A man choosing an action a is better off if the number of other men choosing a decreases, or if the number of women choosing a increases. Analogously, a woman becomes better off if more men or fewer women choose the same action as she does. Existence proofs are constructive: we build simple "best reply" algorithms that converge to an equilibrium.
Subjects: 
congestion
coordination
matching
JEL: 
C70
C72
C78
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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