Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233238 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 22
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
We study farsighted stability under the assumption that coalitions may condition actions on the history of the play. vNM stable set over possible play paths is defined with respect to the indirect dominance relation. We show that such dynamic stable set always exists. It is characterized by a generalization of the ultimate uncovered set. In unbounded agenda setting context, the dynamic stable set implements only efficient outcomes if active coalitions form a majority.
Subjects: 
vNM stable set
farsightedness
dynamic
agenda formation
JEL: 
C71
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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