Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23132
Authors: 
Kirstein, Roland
Will, Birgit E.
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper 2003-03
Abstract: 
We analyze the legal reform concerning employees? inventions in Germany. Using a simple principal-agent model, we derive a unique efficient payment scheme: a bonus which is contingent on the project value. We demonstrate that the old German law creates inefficient incentives. However, the new law concerning university employees and the pending reform proposal concerning other employees also fail to implement first-best incentives. With suboptimal incentives to spend effort on inventions, the government?s goal, an increase in the number of patents, is likely to be missed. (88 words)
Subjects: 
Moral hazard
hold-up
efficient fixed wage
JEL: 
K12
J33
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.