Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23074
Authors: 
Kirstein, Roland
Cooter, Robert
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper 2005-03
Abstract: 
Anti-Sharing may solve the sharing problem of teams: the team members promise a fixed payment to the Anti-Sharer. He collects the actual output and pays out its value to them. We prove that the internal Anti-Sharer is unproductive in equilibrium.
Abstract (Translated): 
Anti-Sharing kann das Teilungsproblem der Teamproduktion lösen: Die Teammitglieder versprechen dem Antisharer zunächst einen fixen Betrag. Der Anti-Sharer bekommt den tatsächlichen Teamoutput und zahlt dessen Wert an jedes Teammitglied aus (vermindert um die fixe Zahlung). Wir zeigen, daß der Anti-Sharer im Gleichgewicht unproduktiv ist.
Subjects: 
team production
sharing problem
bonding
theory of the firm
JEL: 
C72
L23
D23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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