Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22978 
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 3/2007
Publisher: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Abstract: 
everal empirical findings have challenged the traditional trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained.
Subjects: 
limited liability
piece rates
risk aversion
risk-incentives trade-off
JEL: 
D01
M5
D82
J3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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