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Autor:innen: 
Gürtler, Oliver
Kräkel, Matthias
Datum: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 22/2006
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation is ine? cient. Even if market concentration and technological disadvantages lead to a significant welfare reduction after merger, from society´s perspective the agency´s lawsuit may be ine? cient. We can show that these ine? ciencies may be aggravated if the takeover is hostile.
Schlagwörter: 
hostile takeover
litigation contest
merger
JEL: 
L40
D43
K21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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