Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22955
Authors: 
Gerskov, Alex
Schweinzer, Paul
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn econ discussion papers 2006,10
Abstract: 
We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that existing property rights for the service are small enough to enable trade between the agents. In particular, we show on the one hand that no queue under a fully deterministic service schedule such as first-come, first-serve can be dissolved efficiently and meet our requirements. If, on the other hand, the alternative is service anarchy (ie. a random queue), every existing queue can be transformed into an efficient order.
Subjects: 
Scheduling
Queueing
Mechanism design
JEL: 
D82
D44
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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