Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22952
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dc.contributor.authorRosenkranz, Stephanieen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchmitz, Patrick W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:20Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22952-
dc.description.abstractThe fact that according to the celebrated Coase Theorem rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold-up problem, which occurs if non-verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade through Coasean bargaining, may be solved by government intervention. In this sense, the impossibility to rule out Coasean bargaining (after investments are sunk) may in fact justify Pigouvian taxation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2006,7en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordHold-up problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordContractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordTaxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordExternalitiesen_US
dc.subject.stwCoase-Theoremen_US
dc.subject.stwInternalisierung externer Effekteen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.titleCan Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn51141241Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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