Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22938 
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dc.contributor.authorGürtler, Oliveren
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T15:11:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T15:11:12Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22938-
dc.description.abstractThe benefits and costs of different forms of job design have been analyzed in the literature yet. The focus has thereby mostly been on job designs under formal contracts between the parties. However, in the real world relational contracts - informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships - play a role as important as formal ones. This paper therefore considers the advantages and disadvantages of two different kinds of job design, partial del- egation and complete delegation with specialization, when the parties make use of both, formal and informal agreements. It is found that many of the results derived in the absence of informal contracts will no longer hold, if these contracts become available.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn Econ Discussion Papers |x32/2005en
dc.subject.jelL23en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelM54en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordJob designen
dc.subject.keywordrelational contractsen
dc.subject.keywordformal contractsen
dc.subject.keyworddelegationen
dc.titleOn Delegation under Relational Contracts-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn503119814en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:bonedp:322005-

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