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Autoren: 
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
Li, Zhu-yu
Yang, Chaoliang
Datum: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 22/2004
Zusammenfassung: 
When using the strategy method in ultimatum bargaining, many researchers ask responders for the minimal acceptable offer only implicitly assuming strategies to be monotone. Recent research has shown, however, that subjects decline disadvantageous and advantageous proposals. We report on an ultimatum game video experiment where more than 50 percent of the responders rejected advantageous offers. Proposers and responders acted together in groups of three people each and were video taped during decision making. The videotapes then were content analyzed. Our experimental design provides the unique opportunity to learn from participants’ spontaneous discussions about their motivations for rejecting advantageous offers. Main motives are social concern, non-expectancy of high offers, emotional, ethical, and moral reasons, group-specific decision rules and aversion against unpleasant numbers.
Schlagwörter: 
ultimatum game
video experiments
strategy method
content analysis
non-monotone strategies
social preferences
JEL: 
C92
C91
O57
C81
O53
F00
C78
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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