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Autor:innen: 
Kräkel, Matthias
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Harbring, Christine
Selten, Reinhard
Datum: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 12/2004
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our results suggest that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur's identity is revealed sabotage decreases while retaliation motives prevail.
Schlagwörter: 
Contest
Experiments
Sabotage
Tournament
JEL: 
C91
C72
J33
J41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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