Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/228790 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 014.2020
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
In a context of product innovation, we study two-part tariff licensing between a patentee and a potential rival which compete in a differentiated product market characterized by network externalities. The latter are shown to crucially affect the relative profitability of Cournot vs. Bertrand when a per unit royalty is applied. By contrast, we find that Cournot yields higher profits than Bertrand under ad valorem royalties, regardless of the strength of network effects.
Subjects: 
Licensing
Product Innovation
Bertrand
Cournot
Network Effects
JEL: 
L13
L20
D43
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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