Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22825
Authors: 
Gautier, Axel
Mitra, Manipushpak
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 15/2002
Abstract: 
In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity. The second property is self-selection for the less efficient firms. The third property is that the mechanism is a third best one. In other words, as long as the budget-constraint is binding, the optimal output is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. Finally, if the budget constraint is too strong, then we have a full bunching solution.
Subjects: 
Regulation
Asymmetric Information
Budget Constraint
JEL: 
H42
D82
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Social Media Mentions:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.