Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/225969
Authors: 
Yu, Jing
Kocher, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IHS Working Paper 25
Abstract: 
Social dilemmas such as greenhouse gas emission reduction are often characterized by heterogeneity in benefits from solving the dilemma. How should leadership of group members be organized in such a setting? We implement a laboratory public goods experiment with heterogeneous marginal per capita returns from the public good and leading by example that is either implemented exogenously or by self-selection. Our results suggest that both exogenous and selfselected leadership only have a small effect on contributions to the public good. We do not find significant differences in contributions for exogenous and self-selected leadership. Leaders seem to need additional instruments to be more effective when benefits are heterogeneous.
Subjects: 
public goods experiment
heterogeneous benefits
leading by example
JEL: 
C91
D03
D64
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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