Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/224311
Title (translated): 
Quality accounting information and audit effort: The Spanish case
Authors: 
Fenoll-Bernal, Antonio
Serrano Madrid, Jose
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Small Business International Review (SBIR) [ISSN:] 2531-0046 [Volume:] 4 [Year:] 2020 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 52-68
Abstract: 
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si los auditores son capaces de detectar la gestión de resultados en sus empresas auditadas y si ante un incremento en el esfuerzo, el nivel de devengos discrecionales será menor. Como singular contribución, se mide el esfuerzo del auditor mediante las horas efectivamente empleadas, al contrario que trabajos anteriores que se basan en honorarios u horas estimadas o subrogados de estas. Asimismo, la muestra utilizada está compuesta por pequeñas y medianas firmas de auditoría, lo que le aporta un valor añadido por ser este segmento del mercado de auditoría más competitivo. Los resultados evidencian que el cliente reduce los devengos anormales positivos del resultado ante un incremento del esfuerzo del auditor, poniendo así en valor su figura como garante de la información financiera, contribuyendo al debate sobre la calidad de las pequeñas firmas. En lo que respecta a los ajustes por devengo negativos, se puede interpretar una pasividad del auditor ante el conservadurismo contable y un efecto aprendizaje en el cliente, que aumenta la manipulación negativa de resultados conforme se incrementa la duración contractual con el auditor.
Abstract (Translated): 
The objective of this paper is to analyze if small and medium auditors are able to detect the earning managments in their audited companies and, in that case, if the increase of the audit effort produces a lower level of discretionary accruals. As a particular contribution, the auditor's effort has been measured through the hours actually spent, unlike previous work based on estimated or subrogated fees or hours. Similarly, the sample used is composed of small and medium-sized audit firms, which gives added value for this segment of the most competitive audit market. The results show that the client reduces the positive abnormal accruals if the audit effort increases, thus valuing his figure as guarantor of the financial information, contributing to the debate on the quality of small firms. Regarding the negative accrual adjustments, it could be interpreted as an auditor passivity against the accounting conservatism and a learning effect on the client, which increases the negative discretional accruals as the contractual relationship with the auditor increases.
Subjects: 
accruals
audit effort
small auditing firms
ajustes por devengo
esfuerzo del auditor
pequeños auditores
JEL: 
M41
M42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.