Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/222331 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 005
Publisher: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Abstract: 
We develop a general framework for studying contests, including the well-known models of Tullock(1980) and Lazear & Rosen (1981) as special cases. The contest outcome depends on playersâ efforts and skills, the latter being subject to symmetric uncertainty. The model is tractable, because asymmetric equilibrium exists under general assumptions regarding production technologies and skill distributions. Using a link between our contest model and expected utility theory, we are able to derive new comparative statics results regarding how the size and composition of contests affect equilibrium effort, showing how standard results can be overturned. We also discuss the robustness ofour results to changes in the information structure and the implications of our findings for the optimal design of teams.
Subjects: 
contest theory
symmetric equilibrium
heterogeneity
risk
stochastic dominance
JEL: 
C72
D74
D81
J23
M51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.