Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22061
Authors: 
Reichhuber, Anke
Camacho Cuena, Eva
Requate, Till
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics 2008,11
Abstract: 
We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to overharvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects? decisions during the treatments.
Subjects: 
common pool resources
collective tax
framed field experiment
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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