Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/219494 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
EconPol Working Paper No. 32
Verlag: 
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines two prominent approaches to design efficient mechanisms for debt renegotiation with dispersed bondholders: debt exchange offers that promise enhanced liquidation rights to a restricted number of tendering bondholders (favored under U.S. law), and collective action clauses that allow to alter core bond terms after a majority vote (favored under U.K. law). We use a dynamic contingent claims model with a debt overhang problem, where both hold-out and hold-in problems are present. We show that the former leads to a more efficient mitigation of the debt overhang problem than the latter. Dispersed debt is desirable, as exchange offers also achieve a larger and more efficient debt reduction relative to debt held by a single creditor.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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