Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217311 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Citation: 
[Journal:] Central Bank Review (CBR) [ISSN:] 1303-0701 [Volume:] 17 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2017 [Pages:] 127-130
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
This paper studies optimal taxation of bequests in a model where altruistic parents and their offspring disagree on the offspring's labor supply decision. I show that whenever offspring is too lazy from the parent's perspective and there are income effects on labor supply, optimal policy involves a subsidy on bequests.
Subjects: 
Intergenerational disagreement
Bequests
Optimal taxation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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