Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217039
Authors: 
Liu, Jia
Sonntag, Axel
Zizzo, Daniel John
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IHS Working Paper No. 12
Publisher: 
Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna
Abstract: 
We present an experiment that models a repeated public good provision setting where the policy maker or manager does not have perfect control over information flows. Rather, information seeking can be affected by changing the information default as well as the price of information. The default is one either with or without information about others' contributions, and having information comes with a positive, zero or negative financial incentive. When information comes without a financial incentive or even is financially beneficial, almost all subjects choose to have the information, but around a third have the information even when this is costly. Moreover, a default of not having information about the others' contributions leads to a slower unravelling of cooperation, independent of the financial incentives of having information. This slower unravelling is explained by the beliefs about others' contributions in these treatments. A secondary informational default effect appears to take place. When the default is no information, subjects do not seek information more often but, conditional on financial incentives, they tend to believe that more other subjects seek information.
Subjects: 
Information defaults
public good
value of information
JEL: 
C91
D83
H41
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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