Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217037
Authors: 
Angelova, Vera
Güth, Werner
Kocher, Martin G.
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
IHS Working Paper 10
Abstract: 
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
Subjects: 
Cooperation
leadership
social dilemma
public goods provision
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D03
D64
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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