Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/215423 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1850
Versionsangabe: 
This version: March 2020
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides an empirical test of the Coase Theorem. I analyze whether emissions are independent from allowance allocations in the electricity sector regulated under the EU's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Exogenous variation in levels of free allocation for power producing installations enables a difference-in-differences strategy. The analysis reveals that a change in allocation levels does not significantly affect emissions, either at the plant or firm level. However, I identify an adjustment period with temporarily lower emissions for some firms. The results suggest that policy makers may use free allocation as a political tool without compromising the program's costeffectiveness.
Schlagwörter: 
Coase theorem
independence property
cap-and-trade
EU ETS
greenhouse gas emissions
JEL: 
Q54
Q58
Q52
L94
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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