Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/214861 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MUNI ECON Working Paper No. 2019-01
Verlag: 
Masaryk University, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Brno
Zusammenfassung: 
Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. This paper proposes an~experimental design that tests the~anti-corruption effect of staff rotation in situations where public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the~proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the~share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The~outcome of the~staff-rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the~game having a~quantal response equilibrium
Schlagwörter: 
bribery
economic experiment
anti-corruption
staff rotation
corruption
JEL: 
D73
D81
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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