Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212562 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 10/2005
Verlag: 
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
We focus on the con.ict between two central bank objectives individual bank stability and systemic stability.We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) during 1999.2002.Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately, and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal, which suggests a tacit concern for systemic stability.The CBR is also found reluctant to with- draw licenses from banks that violate the individual's deposits-to-capital ratio as this conflicts with the tacit CBR objective to secure depositor confidence and systemic stability.
Schlagwörter: 
Bank supervision
bank crisis
Russia
JEL: 
G2
N2
E5
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
952-462-786-8
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.