Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/212473 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 6/2000
Publisher: 
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT), Helsinki
Abstract: 
In a common assumption of the economics of tax evasion, extending beyond the basic Allingham-Sandmo model, the choice of a taxpayer to evade taxes depends upon the perceived fairness of the tax system.The purpose of the paper is to provide a psychological foundation for this assumption by drawing on Hayek's theory of human behavior as a process of rule following.According to the main hypothesis, taxpayers are more compliant with tax laws to which they can in principle give their full consent.A social contract as a basis of tax policy may provide a potent means to combat tax evasion particularly in transition economies that have inherited a deep mistrust of the government from their socialist past.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
951-686-928-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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