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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 861
Verlag: 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance, London
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider multi-stage games, where at each stage, players receive private signals about past and current states, past actions and past signals, and choose actions. We fully characterize the distributions over actions, states, and signals that obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive additional signals about past and current states, past actions, and past and current signals (including the additional past signals). We interpret our results as revelation principles for information design problems. We apply our characterization to bilateral bargaining problems.
Schlagwörter: 
multi-stage games
information design
communication equilibrium
sequential communication equilibrium
information structures
Bayes correlated equilibrium
revelation principle
JEL: 
C73
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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