Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/207643 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 667
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose the Point Beauty Contest, a mechanism to identify the distribution of focal points on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination, subjects coordinate by the distribution of points. This allows for nuanced coordination strategies, as subjects can invest in multiple alternatives at the same time and weigh their choice. A subject's strategy choice then reveals her perception of the distribution of focal points. In an experiment on the elicitation of social norms, we compare the mechanism with conventional coordination. The data confirms the theoretical predictions regarding coordination behavior and demonstrates that the proposed technique is suited to identify the distribution of focal points on the individual level. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the proposed mechanism identifies focal points on the population level more efficiently than conventional coordination. We point to the possibility of using the mechanism as a simple method to directly measure strategic uncertainty.
Schlagwörter: 
coordination
focal points
games theory
strategic uncertainty
social norms
JEL: 
B41
C70
C91
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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