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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20524
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Gautier, Pieter A. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Moraga-González, José Luis | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:14:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:14:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20524 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobsto apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of thisgame exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one jobexhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workersapply for two or for more (but not for all) jobs always exhibits wage dispersion and, typically,unemployment; (iii) the equilibrium wage distribution with a higher vacancy-to-unemploymentratio first-order stochastically dominates the wage distribution with a lower level of labormarket tightness; (iv) the average wage is non-monotonic in the number of applications; (v)the equilibrium number of applications is non-monotonic in the vacancy-to-unemploymentratio; (vi) a minimum wage increase can be welfare improving because it compresses thewage distribution and reduces the congestion effects caused by the socially excessivenumber of applications; and (vii) the only way to obtain efficiency is to impose a mandatorywage that eliminates wage dispersion altogether. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x1260 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J64 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J41 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D4 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | coordination frictions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | internet | en |
dc.subject.keyword | job search | en |
dc.subject.keyword | minimum wage | en |
dc.subject.keyword | wage dispersion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnbildung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnverhandlungen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nash-Gleichgewicht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Lohnverhandlungstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsuche | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Strategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 395918529 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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