Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20501 
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dc.contributor.authorEpstein, Gil S.en
dc.contributor.authorGang, Ira N.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:14:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:14:34Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/20501-
dc.description.abstractWe examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefitwhen a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to servethe same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rentsobtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We derive acondition under which the concerned parties, the terrorist groups and the local populationupon whom the terrorist groups inflict their actions, benefit or lose in the two scenarios, andexamine the consequences of counter-terrorist policy.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x1237en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordterrorismen
dc.subject.keywordrent-seekingen
dc.subject.keywordall-pay auctionen
dc.subject.keywordlotteryen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Gewalten
dc.subject.stwMachten
dc.subject.stwRent Seekingen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.titleWho Is the Enemy?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn393555038en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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