Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/203662
Authors: 
Donges, Alexander
Selgert, Felix
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Economic History I No. B24-V3
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the consequences of radical patent-regime change by exploiting a natural experiment: the forced adoption of the Prussian patent system in territories annexed after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Compared to other German states, Prussia granted patents more restrictively by setting higher novelty requirements. Though, patent fees were much lower. By using novel hand-collected data, we show that the forced adoption of the Prussian patent law caused a massive drop in the number of patents per capita in annexed territories. By contrast, we find a significantly positive effect of patent-regime change on world-fair exhibits per capita, which we use as a proxy for non-patented innovation. We interpret this finding as evidence that restricting the granting of patents, which creates more competition, is conducive for the generation of innovation.
Subjects: 
Innovation
Intellectual Property
Patents
Patent Law
Technological Change
JEL: 
D2
K11
L51
N0
O14
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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