Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/203590
Authors: 
Jann, Ole
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Economic Theory - Information and Uncertainty No. G01-V3
Abstract: 
I show how irrational ideas and rumors can drive asset prices - not because anyone believes them, but because they are commonly known without being common knowledge. The phenomenon is driven by short-term market participants who are well-informed about the information that others have, and who therefore find it impossible to ignore pieces of news even though they know them to be false, know that others know that they are false, and so on. Informative trading becomes unrationalizable; no information is incorporated into the market price. I discuss implications for how mass media can hurt the informational efficiency of markets.
Subjects: 
Speculation
informational efficiency
multiple equilibria
beauty contest
common knowledge
global games
infection
contagion
JEL: 
D82
D84
G14
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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