Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Irlenbusch, Bernd | en |
dc.contributor.author | Sliwka, Dirk | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-28T16:11:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-01-28T16:11:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2003 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20126 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is shown that direct reciprocal behavior is much stronger in a more transparent situation where efforts are revealed to the principals. However, there is nosignificant impact of transparency on average effort as non-transparency leads to a stronger diversity in behavioral patterns such that at the same time the frequency of very low and very large effort levels increases. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonn | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aIZA Discussion Papers |x887 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | J33 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C91 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | transparency | en |
dc.subject.keyword | reciprocity | en |
dc.subject.keyword | reputation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | gift exchange | en |
dc.subject.keyword | inequity aversion | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsvertrag | en |
dc.subject.stw | Agency Theory | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Gerechtigkeit | en |
dc.subject.stw | Experiment | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 371985439 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.