Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/200404
Authors: 
Budzinski, Oliver
Gänßle, Sophia
Kunz-Kaltenhäuser, Philipp
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 128
Abstract: 
The collective sale of football broadcasting rights constitutes a cartel, which, in the European Union, is only allowed if it complies with a number of conditions and obligations, inter alia, partial unbundling and the no-single-buyer rule. These regulations were defined with traditional TV-markets in mind. However, the landscape of audiovisual broadcasting is quickly changing with online streaming services gaining popularity and relevance. This also alters the effects of the conditions and obligations for the centralized marketing arrangements. Partial unbundling may lead to increasing instead of decreasing prices for consumers. Moreover, the combination of partial unbundling and the no-single-buyer rule forces consumers into multiple subscriptions to several streaming services, which increases transaction costs. Consequently, competition authorities need to rethink the conditions and obligations they impose on centralized marketing arrangements in football. We recommend restricting the exclusivity of (live-)broadcasting rights and mandate third-party access to program guide information to redesign the remedies.
Subjects: 
collective sale of broadcasting rights
sports economics
antitrust
competition policy
centralized marketing
sports and media
football
online media
JEL: 
Z20
Z21
Z28
K21
L40
L83
L82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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