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dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen
dc.contributor.authorBoerner, Kiraen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T16:07:14Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T16:07:14Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/19799-
dc.description.abstractIn transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even they have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as a majority of the people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Our model based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay an entry fee to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead more corruption as more voters are part of the corrupt system. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, can increase the political support for anti-corruption measures.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer |cHannoveren
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aProceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 |x6en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelO17en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordFinancial Marketsen
dc.subject.keywordInstitutionsen
dc.subject.keywordDevelopmenten
dc.subject.keywordVotingen
dc.titleThe Political Economy of Corruption and and the Role of Financial Institutions-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500742979en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:gdec05:3479en

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