Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/194259
Authors: 
Escrihuela-Villar, Marc
Gutiérrez-Hita, Carlos
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 45 [Year:] 2018 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 29-50
Abstract: 
Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreements when firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels than the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. In this context, we first investigate the extent to which collusive agreements are feasible. Secondly, we focus on collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game. We show that, regardless of the degree of cost asymmetry, at least some collusion is always sustainable. Finally, the degree of collusion is also endogeneised to show that cooperation has an upper bound determined by the most inefficient firm.
Subjects: 
Imperfect collusion
cost asymmetries
sustainability
JEL: 
L11
L13
L41
D43
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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