Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/190982
Authors: 
Bornemann, Tobias
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
arqus Discussion Paper 233
Abstract: 
This study analyzes the impact of transfer pricing on multinational enterprises' R&D investment decisions. Specifically, I examine the effects of two commonly used contract designs to exchange and develop intangible assets across group affiliates: licensing and cost sharing agreements. Whilst serving as a tool to allocate taxable income between group affiliates, the economic implications of licensing and cost sharing agreements differ. Whereas licensing agreements provide for a sharing rule on the intangible's profits, cost sharing agreements on the other hand provide a sharing rule on R&D development costs. This difference matters when firms simultaneously use internal transfer prices to allocate taxable income and provide local management with sufficient investment incentives. Using a multiple-agent, moral hazard investment framework I model a multinational firm with comparable group affiliates in two countries that delegates the R&D investment decision to a local risk and effort averse affiliate manager. The results suggest that the optimal contract not only depends on available tax benefits, but also on R&D investment and manager specific characteristics. A licensing agreement provides management with larger incentives to invest in R&D mitigating agency concerns associated with R&D. On the other hand, using a cost sharing agreement the firm can cater different risk preferences among managers potentially increasing investment. The arm's length principle however may distort an efficient allocation of R&D costs when using a cost sharing agreement.
Subjects: 
transfer pricing
R&D investment
taxes
JEL: 
H21
H25
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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