Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/185704 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2017
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 34
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of fixed and incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Banks choose bonus payments that induce excessive managerial risk-taking to maximize their private benefits of existing government bailout guarantees. In this setting the international competition in bonus taxes may feature a \'race to the bottom\' or a \'race to the top\', depending on whether bankers are a source of net positive tax revenue or inflict net fiscal losses on taxpayers as a result of incentive pay. A \'race to the top\' becomes more likely when governments\' impose only lax capital requirements on banks, whereas a \'race to the bottom\' is more likely when bank losses are partly collectivized in a banking union.
Schlagwörter: 
bonus taxes
international tax competition
migration
JEL: 
H20
H87
G28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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