Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18535 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 642
Verlag: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine the process of building social relationships as a non-cooperative game that requires mutual consent and involves reaching out to others at a cost. Players create their social network from amongst their set of acquaintances. Having acquaintances allows players to form naive beliefs about the feasibility of building direct relationships with their acquaintances. These myopic beliefs describe how the other players are expected to respond to the initiation of a link by a player. We introduce a stability concept called ?monadic stability? where agents play a best response to their formed myopic beliefs such that these beliefs are self-confirming. The resulting equilibrium networks form subset of the set of pairwise stable networks.
Schlagwörter: 
Social networks
network formation
pairwise stability
trust
self-confirming equilibrium
JEL: 
D85
C79
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
246.96 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.