Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/18355 
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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:41:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:41:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18355-
dc.description.abstractFollowing Keen and Marchand (1997), the paper analyses the effect of fiscal competition on the composition of public spending in a model where capital and skilled workers are mobile while low skilled workers are immobile. Taxes are levied on capital and labour. Each group of workers benefits from a different kind of public good. Mobility of skilled workers provides an incentive for jurisdictions to spend ?too much? on public goods benefitting the skilled and ?too little? on those benefitting low skilled workers. In the case of capital-skill complementarity, this incentive is strengthened. The analysis is then extended to allow for mobility of unskilled labour.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x504en
dc.subject.jelJ24en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelJ61en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTax competitionen
dc.subject.keywordcapital skill complementarityen
dc.subject.keywordpublic spendingen
dc.subject.stwNew-Keynesian Phillips Curveen
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Preispolitiken
dc.subject.stwPreisstatistiken
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleFiscal Competition, Capital-Skill Complementarity, and the Composition of Public Spending-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn494463309en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp504en

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