Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18355
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dc.contributor.authorBorck, Rainalden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T15:41:02Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T15:41:02Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18355-
dc.description.abstractFollowing Keen and Marchand (1997), the paper analyses the effect of fiscal competition on the composition of public spending in a model where capital and skilled workers are mobile while low skilled workers are immobile. Taxes are levied on capital and labour. Each group of workers benefits from a different kind of public good. Mobility of skilled workers provides an incentive for jurisdictions to spend ?too much? on public goods benefitting the skilled and ?too little? on those benefitting low skilled workers. In the case of capital-skill complementarity, this incentive is strengthened. The analysis is then extended to allow for mobility of unskilled labour.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDIW Discussion Papers |x504en_US
dc.subject.jelJ24en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelJ61en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcapital skill complementarityen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic spendingen_US
dc.subject.stwNew-Keynesian Phillips Curveen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebliche Preispolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwPreisstatistiken_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleFiscal Competition, Capital-Skill Complementarity, and the Composition of Public Spendingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn494463309en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp504en_US

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